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How To Seize a Window of Opportunity: 
The Entry Strategy of Retail Firms into Transition Economies 
 
ABSTRACT 
In most western countries, grocery retailers are faced with maturing domestic markets with a 
year-to-year sales growth close to zero. Moreover, most Western-European markets are 
characterized by a high concentration rate, with a combined market share of the top five players 
easily exceeding 70%. One important outcome of this evolution has been a growing interest in 
cross-border initiatives. However, even though the industry gained importance, retailers are still 
struggling to develop the competencies to compete and survive in this new, more global, arena.  
In this paper, we study entry investments into Central and Eastern-European transition 
economies to unveil when, to what extent, and to which retailer the strategic window in these 
different markets opens. We develop and empirically test a set of hypotheses on factors that 
affect (1) the speed (timing) and (2) size of retailers’ decisions to enter Central and Eastern 
European markets. A conceptual framework is proposed which looks at strategic decisions 
through the option lens. This perspective offers an economic rationale for the behavioral process 
of major resource allocations. The resulting hypotheses are tested, using a joint hazard/poisson-
regression framework, on a data set covering all entry decisions of the top 75 European grocery 
retailers towards Central and Eastern Europe. We find that in these transition economies 
important legitimization effects can be derived from rivals’ actions. Especially the moves, made 
and anticipated, by home rivals are carefully monitored. This reflects the idea that retailers are 
motivated not only by the chance of creating value in these new markets, but also by the fear of 
being left out. 
Keywords: International expansion, Entry decisions, Retailing, Transition Economies 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In most western countries, grocery retailers are faced with maturing domestic markets with a 
year-to-year sales growth close to zero. Moreover, most Western-European markets are 
characterized by a high concentration rate, with a combined market share of the top five players 
easily exceeding 70%. This has led the OECD to conclude that the grocery retail industry can be 
described as a collection of national oligopolies characterized by fierce market-share games 
within each individual market, where price tends to be the most often used weapon (OECD 
2000). As a consequence, players in the retailing industry are at a crossroad, where they have to 
decide what course of action to pursue to preserve, or even improve, their current market 
position. One important avenue is the search for new international markets. However, as recently 
as the early 1990s, foreign sales accounted for less than five percent of the turnover of the 
world’s top five retailers, thereby lagging most of their suppliers (Mulhern 1997). This pattern, 
however, is rapidly changing, as more and more markets in South-East Asia and Eastern Europe 
have opened up over the last decade. At present, the world’s ten largest retailers are known to 
grow faster abroad than domestically, and already operate, on average, in over ten foreign 
markets. The French retail concern Carrefour, for example, recently opened supermarkets in 
Romania, Slovakia, and numerous overseas markets in Asia as well as North and South America. 
The German-based retail group Rewe showed a more geographically concentrated 
internationalization strategy, with new operations in emerging Central and Eastern European 
markets as Poland and Romania.  
Still, in spite of this growing international activity, many retailers appear to be struggling 
to develop the competencies needed to compete and survive in this more global arena (Kumar 
1997). Few succeed in obtaining comparable margins and returns through their foreign 
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operations as in their home markets, and many don’t make break-even volumes. Some of these 
disappointing results have been attributed to the fact that retailers often appear to be motivated 
less by the chance of creating value in a new market than by the fear of being left out by their 
competitors (The Economist 2000).  
Even though Gielens and Dekimpe (2001) found that retailers’ strategic entry decisions, 
such as their timing and size of entry, have a long-lasting impact on the subsequent sales and 
efficiency level of their foreign operation, surprisingly little literature has addressed the 
antecedents of these strategic decisions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap, and present a 
conceptual framework, based on financial option theory, to derive various hypotheses on factors 
that may affect (1) the speed (timing) and (2) size (number of outlets opened at the time of entry) 
of retailers’ internationalization decisions. Using a hazard/poisson-regression framework, we 
subsequently test these hypotheses on a data set covering all international expansion decisions of 
the top 75 European grocery retailers towards Central and Eastern Europe.    
2. CONTRIBUTION 
So far, the academic literature on foreign entry and expansion decisions has mostly focused on 
their performance consequences. Luo (1998), for example, studied the short-run performance 
consequences of the timing, entry mode, and degree of diversification of foreign entries in the 
light industry, while Mascarenhas (1997) investigated the impact of entry size and order of entry 
in the oilrig market. In the retailing industry, Gielens and Dekimpe (2001) studied the long-term 
performance consequences of standardization, mode, timing, and size of entry.  
A second stream of literature focuses on which firm and market factors drive initial entry 
decisions. As such, questions regarding the extent to which rivals’ actions are followed and 
imitated, the match between home- and host-market profile, and which firm’s characteristics 
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tend to be associated with foreign entry, become relevant. Answering these questions may not 
only help managers to select entry strategies given, respectively, the host-market situation and 
their own firm profile, but will also help predict the type of competitors they are likely to face at 
the time of entry (Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo 2002; Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan 1992). 
Among the strategic entry decisions analyzed so far, most attention has been given to the drivers 
of the mode of entry (see, e.g., Erramilli, Agarwal, and Dev 2002; Erramilli and Rao 1993) 
and/or product-standardization (see e.g. Cavusgil, Zou, and Naidu 1993; Chatterjee and Singh 
1999) decision. Despite some recent interest in the timing of international entry (Fuentelsaz et al. 
2002, and Mitra and Golder 2002), the scale of initial investments (i.e. size of entry) and the 
relation between the size and speed of entry have been largely ignored.  
In our work, we extend this second research stream in four ways. First, building on work 
in finance (see, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994; McDonald and Siegel 1986) and strategy (see, e.g., 
Miller and Folta 2002), we consider international entry operations as lumpy investments of firm 
resources in an environment characterized by uncertainty about future performance. Entry 
strategies are seen as a process of organizational resource-investment choices or options (see e.g. 
Bowman and Hurry 1993). In striking these options, the retailer must make two important 
decisions, i.e. when investments in foreign operations are made, and how much capital will be 
invested (Bar-Ilan and Strange 1999). If the strategic window opens for different retailers at 
different moments in time (Abell 1978), and/or if managers’ perceptual biases cause them to 
differ in their interpretation of various market signals (Bowman and Hurry 1993), the likelihood, 
timing and extent of striking the option will vary considerably. Looking at strategic decisions 
through the option lens offers an economic logic for the behavioral process of major resource 
allocations (Dixit 1992). As such, this option perspective has been argued to capture the heart of 
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managerial intuition on organizational investments (Bowman and Hurry 1993), and may thus 
give insight into what factors are taken into account when making international entry decisions. 
Second, we simultaneously consider the size and timing components of international 
entry. Ayal and Zif (1979) argue that in deciding to go abroad, retailers can choose between two 
different expansion alternatives. They can either decide to enter one country at a time, i.e. use a 
sequential strategy, or they can penetrate many countries simultaneously (or within a small time 
span). Clearly, the two strategic options proposed by Ayal and Zif have vastly different timing 
and size implications. So far, despite their importance in competitive strategy, little or no 
attention is paid to the interdependence of these two entry decisions (Douglas and Craig 1992). 
Third, a key focus in our study is the impact of rival foreign activities. So far, the impact 
of (cultural) distance (see, e.g., Barkema, Bell, and Pennings 1996; Mitra and Golder 2002), the 
firm’s dynamic resources and capabilities including its international experience (see, e.g., Chang 
1995; Fuentelsaz et al. 2002; Mitra and Golder 2002), and the market conditions in the host 
market (see, e.g., Davidson 1980; Fuentelsaz et al. 2002) on the whether and/or when to enter 
decision have been studied. Limited attention has, however, been given to the learning/imitation 
effect derived from competitive rivals’ actions, and/or the competitive barriers raised by these 
actions. In line with recent work by Debruyne and Reibstein (2004) we will argue that firms do 
not treat their competitive landscape as homogenous, but rather react more extremely to some 
moves than to others. Because of their common background and comparable endowments, firms 
may follow more easily their domestic rivals’ internationalization actions. Moreover, not only 
are their current internationalization decisions taken into account, we will also argue that retail 
firms take their (home) rivals’ anticipated internationalizations into account when planning their 
own international expansion strategy. 
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Fourth, we consider all entries made by the top-75 Western-European grocery retailers in 
11 Central- and Eastern-European transition economies. Entries by retailers in these transition 
economies provide an ideal setting for assessing the potential imitation and competition effects 
from rival players. Transition economies constitute a major growth opportunity in today’s 
evolving world order (Arnold and Quelch 1998), but are at the same time characterized by a 
substantial amount of environmental uncertainty, making organizational learning both more 
difficult and essential (Luo and Peng 1999). Moreover, all Central and Eastern European markets 
opened up at the same time, and thus became real investment options for all retailers at the same 
moment.  
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A conceptual framework is presented which looks at strategic decisions through the option lens. 
This perspective offers the economic logic and managerial intuition regarding organizational 
investments, and allows identifying key drivers of the entry decisions. 
3.1 Foreign entry investments as real options 
Can value be attached to waiting and/or to entry on a more limited scale, or is it better to act as 
soon as possible at the largest scale that is feasible? In every entry-timing and -size decision, 
retailers have to consider two important dimensions: (1) the potential irreversibility of 
investments (and its associated loss of flexibility), and (2) market uncertainty (cf. Ghemawat 
1991). Because of these two key characteristics, international expansion decisions can be seen as 
real options, which can either be struck (purchased) or deferred (Miller and Folta 2002). 
First, substantial, often not fully reversible, investments are required. Export 
opportunities tend to be missing in the retail industry (Erramilli and Rao 1993). To reach their 
potential customers, retailers have to set up stores, which require logistic networks, relationships 
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with (new) suppliers need to be developed, and assortments of thousands of products have to be 
managed. The German Rewe group, for example, dedicated 100 million USD to set up 5 stores 
in Russia (M+M Planet Retail 2003). This constitutes a considerable investment that is largely 
sunk once made.  
Second, uncertainty exists concerning future returns. This applies to every foreign 
investment (Rivoli and Salorio 1996), but is especially relevant in our setting. Indeed, local 
consumer tastes may differ from those in the home country, while also local suppliers’ customs 
are unknown (The Economist 1999). The resulting problems are even more severe when entering 
emerging markets. Not only is the retail chain still unknown to the local population, the concept 
of modern retail distribution is also unfamiliar in most emerging economies. Moreover, western 
retailers typically do not have any experience operating in such markets, and it is still unclear to 
what extent macro-economic and institutional factors will change (Fahy et al. 2000).  
Because of the perceived opportunity costs, or because they do not want to commit 
themselves (yet) in the midst of high uncertainty, retailers may be reluctant to enter a specific 
market, as they may want to ‘keep their options open’ against the unforeseeable future (Bowman 
and Hurry 1993, p. 761). Indeed, early and extensive commitment tends to reduce flexibility and 
increase risk exposure (Miller and Folta 2002). Depending on the perceived value of the wait 
option, managers may consider to either postpone a given entry (i.e. defer resource allocations), 
or strike the option at a certain scale. Drivers increasing the value of the wait option will 
therefore decrease the speed and size of entry. Likewise, if factors exert a negative effect on the 
value of the wait option, entry tends to become more imminent (McDonald and Siegel 1986), 
making firms less reluctant to commit scarce organizational resources to the selected entry 
option. 
  
 9
3.2 Underlying drivers of the value of the wait option 
Whether or not to proceed with an initial foreign investment, and how much to invest, depends 
on the value of the wait option, which has been argued to be driven by four factors: (1) 
uncertainty about the market evolution, (2) current and future opportunities, (3) time 
dependence, and (4) managerial discretion (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994).  
Having the flexibility to wait is only valuable when uncertainty exists. A firm may prefer 
to postpone an investment until the project’s uncertainty is resolved, especially when the firm 
cannot recuperate a substantial fraction of these investments in case the project fails (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994). As indicated before, both conditions apply in our setting. The higher the 
resulting uncertainty (and the higher the sunk costs), the more valuable the wait option becomes. 
The value of waiting is also related to the future opportunities in the host market. This 
reflects the idea that short-run returns need not be the sole consideration when evaluating a 
potential entry. Entering a market may serve as a gateway to further growth or expansion 
opportunities that may only materialize later (Myers and Majluf 1984). Hence, managers may 
rationally choose to enter new industries even if they anticipate that markets may not 
immediately reward their decision (Folta and O’Brien 2004). As with most emerging markets, 
long-run prospects in Central and Eastern Europe may be considered promising by some 
managers, as they expect increased levels of consumer demand and sophistication, while others 
may be more skeptical (Fahy et al. 2000).  
Time dependence refers to first-mover advantages to be gained or lost. If the investment 
strategy can be imitated quickly, there is less advantage in investing early. On the other hand, if 
there is a high chance that a competitor will preempt a market, the value of the wait option may 
be eradicated overnight. In a retail setting, there may only be room for a few profitable players. 
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The first entrants can select the most attractive locations for their store network, and limit the 
space available for subsequent entrants (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Moreover, in 
several emerging markets, the intensity of competition is picking up faster than consumer 
demand (Fahy et al. 2000), underlining the importance of these time-dependent advantages. 
Managerial discretion reflects whether a retailer is in a good position to implement the 
entry. A firm’s dynamic capabilities determine to what extent a retailer is well placed to react to 
the new opportunity and face the uncertainty in the market. For example, the resource-based 
view of the firm argues that firms should invest in domains that are related to existing resources 
and capabilities, as those assets can subsequently be deployed in a more advantageous manner to 
maximize the present value of future cash flows (see, e.g., King and Tucci 2002). This suggests 
that the value of striking a particular entry option will not only differ across firms, but can also 
be expected to change over time. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
With the opening of the former communist bloc in Eastern Europe, an important source of 
untapped market potential became a real investment option to retailers worldwide. Nevertheless, 
instead of witnessing an undifferentiated rush into all of these markets, entry patterns were found 
to differ substantially across both retailers and host markets. For example, despite the great 
unresolved uncertainties in the Russian market, retail firms as diverse as the Finnish Tradeka 
chain and the French Auchan group took up the challenge to exploit the country’s demand 
opportunities, while major players such as France’s Carrefour and UK-based Tesco are still 
hesitant to invest in the Russian market. Other markets, such as the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, were entered with less hesitation by more players, but even there, quite some 
variability in both entry timing and size was observed. Whereas the French retailer Cora and the 
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Austrian retail group Spar Austria both entered the Hungarian market with only one store in 
1991, their Austrian and German competitors Meinl and Tengelmann opened, respectively, 15 
and 12 stores in their first year of operations (1991). Similarly, in 1996, the German retailer 
Rewe entered the Czech market at full force with 33 stores. Lidl, however, entered that same 
year at a very limited scale with only one store.  
We use the aforementioned four factors, (1) uncertainty, (2) present and future 
opportunities, (3) time dependence, and (4) managerial discretion to develop hypotheses on how 
the value of the option and consequently the speed and size of entry vary with competitive 
actions, retailer resources and host-market attractiveness, as summarized in Figure 1. 
---Insert Figure 1 about here--- 
3.3.1 Competitive actions 
The presence of rivals in a market may affect the value of the wait option, as it impacts several 
of the aforementioned factors.  
Lack of accurate information on retail opportunities in a new market increases 
uncertainty and may delay entry (Martin, Swaminathan, and Mitchell 1998). Prior decisions by 
other retailers may provide crucial information on whether a foreign venture is profitable (see, 
e.g., Henisz and Delios 2001). Following the norm in the industry not only reduces uncertainty 
but also enhances legitimacy, as a given practice is seen as appropriate. As a consequence, 
pioneering entrants are often imitated by other players in the industry (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Carrefour’s entry in Taiwan, for example, is widely thought to have attracted new 
entrants into the market. Moreover, in imitating these actions, one prevents the early entrants 
from monopolizing strategic capabilities that can also be used in other, both domestic and 
foreign, markets (Flowers 1976; Knickerbocker 1973). The value of the option to wait is thus 
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expected to decrease with every rival player entering the host market, which will positively 
impact the speed and size of entry. 
Other researchers, in contrast, have emphasized that rival players tend to decrease host-
market opportunities. With every rival entering, market competition becomes tougher, raising a 
barrier to further entry. Cotterill and Haller (1992) point out that especially in the context of 
grocery retailing, aggressive responses to subsequent entries are common. This causes an 
increase in the cost of later entry (Hannan and Caroll 1992). As a consequence, the presence of 
rivals may decrease the present and future opportunities of the entry, reducing the value of 
striking the option.  
The ecology literature (Hannan and Freeman 1977) tries to reconcile these conflicting 
views. They acknowledge that, initially, the presence of rivals facilitates a process of social 
recognition or legitimization, and therefore attracts new entrants into the host market. Still, as 
competitive investments in a host country increase, the market’s carrying capacity is gradually 
fulfilled, the best geographical locations preempted, and several future market opportunities 
depleted, creating a deterring effect that eventually dominates the legitimization effect. 
Following this line of reasoning, we expect two opposing forces, i.e. rival imitation and 
deterrence, to be at work. It remains a priori difficult to predict which force will prevail at what 
range of competitive activity. As such, we will allow for a quadratic relationship between the 
entry decisions and the expected competitive activity, allowing for (inverted) U-shaped, positive 
and negative monotonic relationships. Moreover, we argue that the relative strength of both 
forces depends on the geographic (i.e. home-based versus foreign) and temporal (i.e. actual 
versus anticipated) proximity of the competitive actions.  
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The impact of home versus foreign rivals. So far, the presence of rivals in the host market 
was evaluated irrespective of their origin. Firms may, however, not attach equal weight to the 
actions of all competitors (Garcia-Pont and Nohria 2002). As postulated in competitive cognition 
theory, companies do not consider their competitive landscape to be homogenous (Debruyne and 
Reibstein 2004). The relevant comparison group may not consist of all players in the industry, 
but rather of those retailers with which they are in close social contact (Guillèn 2002). We test in 
this respect whether firms monitor more closely the foreign-entry decisions of their home 
competitors than of their foreign rivals. 
Indeed, information on the expansion process and relative success of domestic rivals may 
be easier to obtain, and perceived as more relevant, than information from other entrants. 
Domestic rivals have a common background, and have built their firm-specific retail capabilities 
in a common domestic market (Martin et al. 1998). Because of the resulting similarity in 
resource endowments, observing how the home-market rivals operate in the new host market 
may be more effective in reducing uncertainty and increasing managerial discretion than entries 
made by foreign rivals (Chen 1996). Moreover, retailers may be more inclined to closely monitor 
their home-market rivals, as they may fear the potential cross-subsidization towards the home 
market that might result from a successful international expansion (Flowers 1976). In sum, we 
expect the imitation process to be more prominent for domestic rivals than for foreign firms.  
The impact of actual versus anticipated rivals. Next, we examine to what extent actual 
entries into the host market have a different impact from anticipated (future) competitive moves 
(Bain 1956). A retail firm is obviously confronted with players that already operate in the host 
market, but may also anticipate actions by players not yet present. Indeed, it may be important to 
act upon time-dependent advantages and lock in markets to make it ever more difficult for 
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competitors to subsequently gain a toehold into those markets (Wind 1997). Hence, pro-active 
behavior may be crucial to avoid potential late-mover disadvantages. Nevertheless, retail 
expertise and social cognition will be more difficult to derive from anticipated future rival 
actions, which de facto carry an additional level of uncertainty. We therefore expect the imitation 
process to be less pronounced. 
3.3.2 Retailer resources 
Competitive pressures may not be the only factors that affect the value of the wait option. We 
also consider the impact of the following firm resources: (1) international experience, (2) 
assortment policy, as reflected in the role played by the retailer’s private label, and (3) firm size.  
International experience. Davidson and Harrigan (1977) argue that firms with extensive 
prior involvement in foreign markets are likely to respond differently from those without. 
International experience reduces uncertainty, and increases the available opportunities and 
managerial discretion. As the retailer gains experience in assessing foreign countries’ culture, the 
nature of the prevailing business practices and/or the consumers’ preferences, the perceived 
uncertainty of an additional, or more substantial, international expansion is reduced (Barkema et 
al. 1996), thereby reducing the value of the wait option. Moreover, during prior 
internationalizations, routines for analyzing the potential of foreign opportunities are likely to 
have developed (King and Tucci 2002), reducing the cost and increasing the expected return of 
the opportunity-identification process. Finally, as experience has been shown to be a prime 
source of learning in organizations (Luo and Peng 1999), it increases the ability to make good 
judgments and hence, managerial discretion. 
We distinguish between two different facets of international experience, i.e. worldwide 
and regional experience. The former is based upon a retailer’s global experience without 
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reference to a specific market (Li 1994). It reflects its ability and confidence in assessing 
consumers’ needs and estimating costs and returns, which will ultimately lead to a better 
assessment of the economic value of the new market (Davidson 1980). Regional experience, in 
contrast, is acquired through operations in a specific target area (Li 1994). It refers to both 
logistical advantages and the more extensive intelligence-gathering capabilities in the region 
(Tan and Vertinsky 1996). Both forms of experience are thought to decrease the value of the wait 
option, and thus to increase the speed and size of entry.  
Assortment policy: Private-label share. A substantial share of private labels within the 
retailer’s assortment may impact uncertainty, present and future opportunities, and managerial 
discretion. Most retailers entering new markets are unknown to their potential customers. 
Retailers who rely heavily on private labels not only have to convince customers in the new 
markets to switch stores, but to also switch brands. Moreover, in terms of the branded products 
they want to carry, they may not have an as comfortable position in manufacturer-retailer 
negotiations as other retailers (Kumar 1997). Finally, private-label programs require the retailer 
to carry a lot of functions and costs (e.g. inventory, promotions etc.) the manufacturer normally 
takes care of. Performing these functions in a new host market may not be evident. As it is hard 
for retailers to predict how consumers and suppliers will react to their private label, a strong 
commitment to private labels can increase uncertainty, decrease present and future opportunities, 
and reduce managerial discretion. 
Firm size. Firm size has been described as a proxy for market power, while it has also 
been identified as a potential source of inertia. As such, firm size may impact the value of the 
wait option by changing the ability to act upon time dependent advantages and by influencing 
managerial discretion. Firm size has been associated with market power in both domestic and 
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international contexts (Gaba, Pan, and Ungson 2002). It is argued that larger firms compete in a 
broader spectrum of products and markets using scale and scope economies, allowing them to 
identify more, as well as react more quickly, to time-dependent opportunities. For example, 
larger retailers are better able to make pre-emptive moves that limit or prevent later entrants 
from gaining access to suppliers, markets, customers and other scarce resources (Kobrin 1991). 
They are also likely to have stronger bargaining power to gain concessions from the host-country 
government (Brewer 1993), all of which allow for a wider freedom of choice and increased 
managerial discretion. Moreover, larger retailers are also likely to have more financial resources, 
which provide a buffer against downside risks (Haveman 1993).  
In contrast, bureaucratic tendencies arising from greater structural complexity, 
differentiation, formalization etc., are supposed to lead to increased rigidity and inertial pressures 
(Crozier 1964). This will negatively affect a retailer’s ability to react quickly to changing 
environments or to grasp new opportunities. As such, larger retailers may be less able to exploit 
time-dependent advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). 
Because of these opposing forces, the impact of firm size on the value of the wait option 
is hard to a priori predict. 
3.3.3 Host-market attractiveness 
A firm is more likely to enter a new market if it can identify a set of buyers from which it stands 
a reasonable chance of successfully obtaining sales (Mitra and Golder 2002). In this study, we 
look at the impact of expected retail sales, and the fit between host-country and retail operations. 
Expected retail sales. Market potential is directly related to a market’s uncertainty and 
opportunity, and is often regarded as the economic reason for market entry (Caves 1982). 
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Indications of rising expected retail sales decrease market uncertainty and increase one’s 
appreciation of future opportunities. 
Host-market fit: distance. Similarity between the host market and the retail firm’s current 
operations increases the attractiveness of a new market, and decreases the value of the wait 
option. Indeed, this similarity will determine how difficult it will be to implement a knowledge 
transfer, which will in turn affect managers’ perceived level of uncertainty, the accuracy with 
which they can assess future opportunities, and how much flexibility (discretion) they will have 
to pursue alternative courses of action. We consider the impact of cultural, geographic, and 
economic distance. Globalizing firms have to adjust to different foreign cultures, and are more 
likely to fail when this acculturation is more demanding (Barkema et al. 1996; Davidson 1983). 
Adjustments to a foreign culture increase costs and risks, while reducing managerial discretion 
(Mitra and Golder 2002). As for geographic distance, retailers which already have operations 
close to the new foreign market may have some logistical advantages, and are better able to 
control activities (Ghemawat 2001). On the demand side, they may also have a better and more 
detailed understanding of the prospective customers in the host market (Cotterill and Haller 
1992). Finally, economic distance is considered, as it is hard to replicate an existing business 
model in a country where customer income, not to mention the cost and quality of resources, are 
very different (Ghemawhat 2001). Comparable economic characteristics will also facilitate 
knowledge transfer (Mitra and Golder 2002), thereby reducing uncertainty and increasing 
managerial discretion. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
To test the hypotheses, we propose a modeling approach that simultaneously considers the 
timing and size of the entry decision. A maximum-likelihood framework is used to estimate both 
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decision components, with a hazard specification for the timing dimension, and a poisson-
regression specification for the size issue. An explicit correction is made for the stratified nature 
of the observations. Indeed, not all observations can be treated as independent, in that multiple 
observations cover an international entry into the same target country. We first discuss how we 
incorporate, respectively, the speed and size component. Next, we indicate how we capture their 
inter-relationship. 
4.1 Speed of entry decision 
A proportional hazard model is used (Cox, 1972), where we define the entry rate at year t for 
retailer i (i = 1..I) in country j (j = 1..J) as λij(t) , with  
( ) ( )( ) exp ,ij oj ijt t X tλ λ β⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
where Xij(t) represents a vector of time-varying covariates. λ0j(t) is the baseline hazard rate in j, 
which represents the entry rate assuming all covariates equal to zero, and β represents the vector 
of parameters. Estimation is based on the partial likelihood. For country j, this function has the 
following expression, 
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with cij equal to one (zero) for completed (censored) observations. Its use allows us to effectively 
exclude from the numerator those retailers, which did not experience an entry event into country 
j by the end of the observation period. For those firms that did experience an event at a specific 
time (tij), one considers the likelihood that the event happened to firm i rather than to one of the 
other firms still ‘at risk’ (i.e. those that can still enter), at that time. To determine the relevant 
risk set, a set of indicator variables Yli is created, with Yli = 1 if tlj ≥ tij, and Yli = 0 if tlj<tij. In 
(2) 
(1) 
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doing so, one effectively concentrates on the order in which the various events took place (see 
Allison 1984 for an in-depth discussion).1 A key advantage of the approach is that it does not 
require a distributional specification for the baseline hazard, as it no longer appears in Equation 
(2).  
When considering the entry process across J markets, one combines the various partial 
likelihood expressions, i.e. 
1 1 1
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A common set ofβ’s is assumed across the various countries. Still, the risk set (and hence the 
relevant order of occurrence of the various events) is defined on a country-by-country basis. This 
procedure is known as a stratified proportional Cox approach (see Mitra and Golder 2002 for a 
marketing application), which no longer assumes that all observations (across the various 
countries) are independent, but only that the observations are conditionally independent within a 
given country or stratum. 
4.2 Size of entry decision 
When entry occurred for retailer i in country j in the observation span, we record the number of 
stores zij opened in the initial year of entry. To account for the discrete nature of these data, we 
adopt a Poisson regression model (see, e.g., Greene 2000). Specifically, it is assumed that each zij 
is drawn from a Poisson distribution with parameter γij, implying that:  
( )
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1 Note that even though censored observations are excluded from the numerator in Eq. 2, they do appear in the risk-
(3) 
(4) 
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Covariates can be included by specifying γij as:  
expij ijcYγ ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ , 
where Yij is a vector of covariates, and where c is the vector of parameters to be estimated. The 
size decision only becomes relevant if entry actually occurred, implying that the distribution of 
responses is truncated above zero (Bucklin, Gupta, and Siddarth 1998; Greene 2000):  
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To account for correlations within host countries, a generalized linear estimation approach is 
used (Liang and Zeger 1986) which has been shown to be robust to covariance-structure 
misspecifications (Goldstein, Brown, and Rasbash 2002).  
4.3 Relation between timing and size of entry decisions 
We adopt a recursive approach, and assume the size decision to be dependent upon the timing 
decision. We therefore add the year of entry as additional variable in the poisson model.2 This 
approach is based on the theoretical argument that entry decisions can be considered lumpy 
investments, which are discrete and occasional events. The level of such an investment decision 
tends to be made after the decision to invest has been made, as argued in Bar-Ilan and Strange 
(1999). This is also in line with previous empirical work. In the international-business literature, 
Bowman, Farley, and Schmittlein (2000) describe a similar sequential decision process for the 
selection and level of use of international service providers. In the international diffusion 
literature, Dekimpe, Sarvary, and Parker (2000) make the full-adoption stage dependent on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
set composition of the denominator. 
2 Note that we model the dependence between the timing and size decision by including an observable covariate 
(time of entry) in the size equation, which is comparable to the linkage in the coupled-hazard approach of Dekimpe 
et al. (2000). This ensures that the overall likelihood function becomes separable, allowing a separate estimation of 
(6) 
(5) 
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timing of that country’s initial adoption decision. Finally, in the individual-choice literature, 
Bucklin et al. (1998) propose to model the purchase-quantity decision conditional on the timing 
decision.  
In terms of the expected sign of this relationship, two opposing arguments can be posited. 
First, early entrants may prefer large-scale entry, as it may expand the size of the market, send 
signals of commitment, and deter duplication (Ghemawat 1991). These arguments suggest that 
early entrants may benefit from large-scale entry, causing a negative relationship between size 
and timing of entry. In contrast, a positive relationship could be posited as well. If one enters 
early, the risk of not recovering overhead costs may be substantial and higher commitment 
implies higher risk exposure. These risks can be especially substantial if the host market is in an 
early stage of development, suggesting limited initial scale when entering early in transition 
economies.  
5. DATA 
We trace the entry behavior of 75 European grocery retailers into 11 Central- and Eastern-
European markets (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia) from 1989 until 2001, resulting in 825 potential 
retailer-market combinations. Grocery retailers were included in the sample if the firm listed 
among the 75 largest grocery retailers in Europe based on total consolidated food sales in 1991 
(M+M Eurodata/Planetretail). The year 1989 was chosen as starting year, as the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in that year symbolizes the opening of the former East Bloc.3 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
both processes. Corrections for (possibly correlated) unobserved heterogeneity are left as an important area for 
future research. 
 
3 Following Gielens and Dekimpe (2001), we consider all entries through greenfield expansion and acquisition, and 
also include joint ventures. Selection bias was avoided in two ways. First, we used a historic perspective (Golder 
and Tellis 1993) to gather information on all entries that occurred within our observation period. As such, 
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Western European retailers were selected as they are the frontrunners in the globalization 
of grocery retailing (OECD 2000). Only since the mid-1990s, a few American chains (such as 
Wal-Mart and Kmart) joined the internationalization move. The selection of Central and Eastern 
Europe as a target market offers various advantages. First, the fall of the Berlin Wall is a natural 
starting point for the timing decision. As no modern retailers were present in the target market, 
one is able to test the impact of the different drivers in a ‘tabula rasa’ situation. Second, the 
various markets opened to all retailers at the same time. Little confounding effects are therefore 
expected to be present. Finally, transition economies provide an ideal setting for assessing the 
impact of learning derived from competitors, as these countries are characterized by a substantial 
amount of environmental uncertainty (Luo and Peng 1999).  
Data on market entries, competitive actions and firm characteristics are obtained from 
M+M Eurodata/Planet Retail. The data for the distance measures come from different sources, 
including the Worldbank (2003) and Hofstede (2002).  
5.1 Dependent variable: timing of entry 
For every possible retailer-country combination, we record whether the retailer entered the 
market. If entry took place (i.e. for the completed observations), timing is measured as the 
number of years elapsed between the opening of the market (1990)4 and the entry date. 
Observations can be censored for two reasons. First, it could be that no entry occurred by the end 
of the observation period (December 2001). Timing is then captured as the number of years (13) 
elapsed between the opening of the market and 2002. Second, in a few instances, a retail firm 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
information on entries which were abandoned by the end of the observation period was also taken into account. The 
information was obtained by sequentially checking all M+M Eurodata/Planetretail publications from 1991 (first 
edition) onwards, as well as various other trade publications that appeared around the time of entry.  Second, we 
include in our sample timing information on both entrants and non-entrants.  
4 As the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, 1990 was taken as the first year in which entry could actually take 
place. 
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was taken over. In these cases, the date of acquisition was used as censoring date.5 Of the 75 
retail firms included in the sample, 40 firms entered one or more Eastern-European markets. The 
total number of recorded entries amounts to 119, which represents a hit rate of 14.4%. The 
median time until entry for the non-censored observations is 6.  
5.2 Dependent variable: Size of entry 
The size of entry is defined as the number of outlets opened in the first year. Various measures 
could be used to quantify the foreign presence of chain activities: (1) the number of 
outlets/branches (Fuentelsaz et al. 2002), (2) the combined value of the assets of all outlets 
(Hultman and McGee 1989), and/or (3) the total store surface at entry (Gielens and Dekimpe 
2001). We adopt the first measure, as in industries like grocery retailing, the firm requires 
multiple outlets to build a close-contact relationship with its prospective consumers (Fuentelsaz 
et al. 2002). Initial entry size varied considerably (range [1, 63]) with a mean value of 8.4. 
5.3 Explanatory variables 
We subsequently discuss the operationalization of the competitive drivers, firm characteristics, 
and host-market attractiveness variables. All explanatory variables are measured at an annual 
level of temporal aggregation, and are time-varying. Following Steenkamp, ter Hofstede, and 
Wedel (1999), we mean-center all explanatory variables within countries. This ensures that 
differences in the mean levels between countries do not affect our hypothesis testing. 
5.3.1 Competitive presence 
Presence of home-country players in the host market at time t is defined as the ratio 
between the number of past entries by home-market players by the end of the year prior to entry, 
                                                          
5 Retailers that were taken over are censored before the end of the observation window. They are deleted from the 
set of “retailers still at risk”, and thus the nominator of Equation 2, as soon as the timing of a particular entry 
exceeds the time of acquisition.  
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and the number of major home players.6 We express this presence in relative rather than absolute 
terms to correct for differences in the number of rivals present in the home market (see Dekimpe 
et al. 2000 for a similar practice). The German retailer Rewe, for example, entered the Czech 
market in 1996. At the time of entry, Rewe encountered in the new host market its German rivals 
Norma, Tengelmann, and Edeka, which, respectively, entered in 1991, 1992 and 1993. In its 
German home market, Rewe encountered 14 major rivals. Consequently, the proportion of 
home-based rivals present in the Czech market until 1991 was 0%, 7% in 1992 (1/14), 14% in 
1993 (2/14) and 21% (3/14) from 1994 to 1996. The proportion of foreign players in the host 
market at time t is defined in a similar way.7 In terms of Rewe’s move into the Czech Republic, 
six foreign players were present before 1996. In the 13 countries represented in our sample 
(besides Germany) 80 retailers had a home market share exceeding 1%. As such, the proportion 
of foreign players encountered by Rewe in the Czech Republic is 7.5% (6/80). 
The anticipated actions by home-country players are operationalized as the ratio of the 
number of anticipated entries made by home competitors at different points in time to the 
number of major home-market rivals. The number of observed actions at time t+1 is used as 
proxy for the anticipated entry level at time t, thereby following Doyle and Saunders (1985), 
McDonald and Van de Gucht (1998), and van Heerde, Leeflang, and Wittink (2001), among 
others. In 1997, i.e. the year following Rewe’s entry in the Czech Republic, two more German 
firms, Lidl and Metro, entered the Czech market. The proportion of anticipated actions by 
Rewe’s home players thus amounted to 14%. A comparable operationalization is used to 
quantify the anticipated actions by foreign players. 
                                                          
6 Major players are defined as firms that have a market share exceeding 1%. 
7 We focus exclusively on the number of non-local players, as no real local retail infrastructure existed in most 
Eastern-European markets.  
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5.3.2 Firm resources 
Worldwide experience in period t is expressed as the cumulative number of international markets 
the firms entered by the end of the previous year (cf. Tan and Vertinsky 1996). Regional 
experience is defined as the number of outlets opened throughout Eastern Europe by a given 
retail firm, again by the end of the previous year (cf. Li 1994). The number of outlets is used, as 
this better captures the advantages from having a logistic network in the region. The annual 
private label share in the retailer’s home market measures the extent to which the retailer 
depends on private labels in its home market (Gielens and Dekimpe 2001). To capture size 
effects, consolidated deflated sales were recorded (cf. Gatignon, Weitz, and Bansal 1990).  
5.3.3 Host market attractiveness 
Retail sales expectations at time t are calculated as the combined host-market sales by all 
international retailers in t+1. Cultural distance is measured as a composite index using 
Hofstede’s data (2002) on the four dimensions of culture (individualism, uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, and masculinity) (Kogut and Singh 1988). We measure this distance as the 
difference between the new host market and the culturally most similar market the retailer is 
already operating from. This most similar market can obviously change over time as the retailer 
expands his international coverage.8 For retailers with no international activities, the most 
similar market is the home market. Geographic distance is expressed as the shortest distance in 
miles between the host-market capital and the capital of another country the retailer is already 
operating in. For economic distance, we first select two measures to reflect the economic 
attractiveness of the retail climate in a country. Specifically, we consider GNP per capita as a 
measure for economic prosperity, and number of inhabitants as a measure of potential scale. We 
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then create distance measures by taking the absolute value of the difference between each 
economic attractiveness variable for the domestic and host country (cf. Mitra and Golder 2002).9  
6. RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the unstandardized parameter estimates and their associated t-values. Given the 
directional nature of most of our hypotheses, one-sided tests are used, except for the impact of 
firm size and the timing decision. 
---Insert Table 1 about here--- 
Competitive actions. As indicated before, two opposing forces, imitation and deterrence, 
may be at work. A priori, it is difficult to predict which of these two forces will prevail at what 
range of competitive activity. As such, a quadratic relationship was specified to allow for the 
flexibility to incorporate (inverted) U, as well as monotonically increasing/decreasing 
relationships between competitive activity and the speed and size of entry. This flexibility was 
found to be appropriate, as four out of eight quadratic terms were negative and significant.  
Three of these inverted U-patterns were observed in relation to the home-based rivals. A 
curvilinear relationship was found between the actual proportion of home players present in the 
host market and the speed of entry, as illustrated by the positive significant linear [β1 = .939 (p < 
.01)] and the negative significant quadratic component [β2 = -.534 (p < .01)]. Anticipations 
concerning home players’ entries into the host market were also curvilinearly related to the speed 
of entry decision [β5 = .446 (p < .01), β6 = -.139 (p < .01)]. With respect to the relationship 
between the size of entry decision and the proportion of future entrants, a clear inverted-U 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 For example, when Rewe entered Slovakia in 2002, the culturally nearest market was the Czech Republic, and no 
longer its home market, Germany. 
9 As the economic conditions between the emerging and Western European markets differ dramatically, the home 
market is always used as reference market. 
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relationship was found as well [γ5 = .263 (p < .01), γ6 = -.153 (p < .01)]. However, with respect to 
the actual proportion of home players present in the host market a positive significant linear 
component was found; the quadratic component, while negative, did not reach statistical 
significance [γ1 = .418 (p < .01), γ2 = -.612 (p > .10)]. So, the more home players present in the 
market, the more initial investments tend to be made at the time of entry.  
To get a better understanding of these effects, we present them graphically. Figure 2 
illustrates the impact of the actual and expected number of home-based players present in the 
host market on the speed and size of entry in the Czech Republic in 1997.10 The horizontal axis 
represents the proportion of home-based players present or expected, while the rate of entry 
(speed decision) or store openings (size of entry) is represented on the vertical axis.11  
---Insert Figure 2 about here--- 
In 1997, German retailers envisioning to enter the Czech Republic observed that 56% of their 
key domestic rivals were already active in that market. At that point, the mean level of domestic 
rivals present in the Czech Republic amounted to 23%. As a consequence, the entry rate for 
German retailers was about 28% (= exp(.94*(.56-.23)-.53(.56-.23)2)) higher than for retailers 
who encountered an average proportion of their domestic rivals in that market. At that point, 
French retailers encountered 10% of their domestic rivals in the Czech market. Their 
corresponding entry rate was 9% lower than for retailers encountering an average fraction of 
domestic rivals. 
Even though the quadratic term is negative and significant for both actual and future 
actions by home-based rivals (i.e. -.534 for the actual number of home players and -.139 for the 
                                                          
10 Slight differences may occur between graphs across other countries and over time. All covariates were mean-
centered, and these means can change over time and countries.  
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anticipated number), we observe (Figure 2A) a monotonically increasing pattern over the 
relevant data range (0-1) on the speed of entry decision. The learning or imitation effect from an 
additional (actual or anticipated) entry by a home rival thus dominates its potential deterring 
effects. Still, the latter cause the net effect to level off, as ever higher fractions of home rivals are 
present/expected. Moreover, in line with our theorizing, we find this effect to be stronger with 
respect to actual competitive actions, as we observe the curve corresponding to the proportion of 
actual home–based actions to lie above the corresponding curve for anticipated actions. Only 
when a limited proportion of players is present, retailers (are forced to) derive more ‘cognition’ 
from their competitors’ anticipated moves. In terms of the size decision (Figure 2B), quite 
similar conclusions emerge in that the imitation effect dominates when considering the actual 
and anticipated moves by a chain’s home-market competitors (resulting in a positively-sloped 
curve). Moreover, the impact of actual actions tends to be larger than the impact of the 
anticipated moves.  
With respect to impact of the foreign rivals in the host market, the interplay between the 
imitation and deterrence effect is more diverse. An inverted-U effect was found for the impact of 
the foreign rivals present in the host market on the speed of entry [β3 = .585 (p < .01), β4= -.812 
(p < .05)]. In contrast, the proportion of foreign players anticipated to enter the host market has a 
strong negative impact on the speed of entry decision [β7 = -.536 (p < .01), β8 = -.177 (p > .10)]. 
With respect to the size decision, a positive effect [γ3 = .132 (p < .01), γ4 = .989 (p > .10)] is 
reported for the actual foreign presence, which again becomes negative when additional foreign 
activity is expected in the near future [γ7 = -.140 (p < .01), γ8= -.260 (p > .10)]. Figure 3 
illustrates these effects. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 As the independent variables were mean centered, our results are presented relative to the average within a 
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---Insert Figure 3 about here--- 
In contrast to the impact of the home-based rivals, the deterrence effect is much more 
prevalent when considering the impact of (actual and anticipated) entries by foreign rivals 
(Figure 3A). With respect to the speed of entry decision, we find that once the actual number 
exceeds 59%, the imitation effect from an additional entry is outweighed by the deterrence 
effect, which even dominates over the entire data range in case of anticipated foreign entries. 
Regarding the size effect, we find that the curve for the foreign players already present is flatter 
than the corresponding curve for the home competitors suggesting that also in this case the 
deterrence (imitation) effect is relatively larger (smaller) in case of foreign rivals. When looking 
at the anticipated entries, when yet another layer of uncertainty is added, the deterrence effect 
becomes even more pronounced, and, as with the speed decision, a negatively sloped curve is 
obtained. Hence, even though the relative effect of both forces, imitation and deterrence, varies 
across the considered cases and across the range of competitive activity, we find, in line with our 
theorizing, consistent support for the notion that the imitation (deterrence) effect becomes less 
(more) pronounced as the geographic (home versus foreign) and temporal (current versus 
anticipated) distance increases. 
Firm resources. More international experience, both worldwide and regional, increases 
the speed of entry [β9 = .100 (p < .01), β10 = .004 (p < .01)], as was expected. Also in line with 
our hypotheses, we find that regional experience positively impacts the size component [γ10 = 
.004 (p < .05)]. However, contrary to expectations, we find that more international experience 
results in less stores opened at the time of entry [γ9 = -.039 (p < .10)]. If retailers operate in many 
geographically dispersed markets, its resources become more thinly spread, hampering a large-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
country. 
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scale entry in each market. Regional experience, in contrast, ensures the necessary logistic 
support to open more stores in the Central- and Eastern European region. As predicted, the share 
of private labels in the assortment negatively influences the speed and size decision [ β11 = -.005 
(p < .05), γ11 = -.005 (p < .05)]. The impact of firm size reached statistical significance on neither 
the speed of entry nor the size decision [β12 = -.0002 (p > .10), γ12 = .0001 (p > .10)].  
Market attractiveness. In line with our expectations, both the speed and size decision are 
positively influenced by the retail sales expectations in the target country [β13  = .001 (p < .05), 
γ13 = .005 (p < .01)]. In contrast, no support was found for the expected negative effect of 
cultural distance on speed of entry [β14 = .006 (p > .10)]. However, we found that fewer outlets 
are opened at the time of entry as the cultural distance increases [γ14 = -.020 (p < .01)], as 
expected. Likewise, both the speed and size of entry decrease significantly with the geographic 
distance [β15 = -.001 (p < .01), γ15 = -.0003 (p < .01)], thereby corroborating our propositions. 
Next, we find that the speed of entry decision is lower in markets characterized by economic 
conditions different from the home market, as we report a negative effect for both the differences 
in GNP per capita and market size [β16 = -.039 (p < .05), β17 = -.012 (p < .01)]. Likewise, also the 
size decision is negatively influenced by differences in economic conditions between host and 
home market [γ16 = -.0001 (p < .05), γ17 = -.013 (p < .05)], which confirms our expectations. 
Finally, as discussed in the method section, we included the timing variable in the size 
decision. A negative significant effect is found [γ18 = -.075 (p < .05, two sided test)]. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we used the option lens to get a better understanding of the diversity in entry 
strategies. Entry decisions can be viewed as organizational investment choices or options. In 
deciding on the timing and extent of striking these different options, retailers have to find a 
balance between market uncertainty, the perceived (future) growth opportunities in the various 
target markets, potential time-dependent (dis)advantages, and managerial discretion. As such, 
theory-based expectations on various antecedents of the timing and size of expansion decisions 
into emerging markets were derived. A vast majority of our empirical findings is in line with 
expectations, which confirms prior claims (Bowman and Hurry 1993) that the option perspective 
captures managerial intuition on organizational investments, and supports the existence of a 
certain amount of rationality in making these decisions. 
 A key driver was found to be the competitors’ entry decisions. Especially the moves 
made by one’s home rivals are carefully followed. The presence of home rivals reduces the 
perceived market uncertainty, as firms with similar backgrounds have already made the move 
and appear to be successful. This was explicitly acknowledged by France’s Auchan, as it cited 
the presence of its French rivals such as Leclerc and Casino as one of the key drivers to also 
enter Poland (Polish News Bulletin 2000). Moreover, it explains why national clusters emerged 
in the early stages of the internationalization wave towards Central and Eastern Europe. Finnish 
retailers, for example, demonstrate a clear preference for the Baltic countries, while relatively 
more French retail groups have embarked on entries into Romania. This strong focus on the 
home rivals’ actions is not necessarily nearsighted. The information on their relative success may 
be more accurate and informative, and entering the same market as one’s competitors may 
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prevent them from monopolizing certain skills that could subsequently proof useful in 
undermining one’s position in the home market.  
Nevertheless, we find that the strong impact emanating from the firm’s home rivals does 
not imply that foreign players are completely ignored. Interestingly, however, we find the 
deterrence effect of the latter’s (actual or anticipated) presence to be much more prominent. 
Anecdotal evidence in support of this result is found in Carrefour’s announcement that it 
postpones its Hungarian expansion in favor of Romania and China to avoid the tough 
competition of foreign chains such as U.K.’s Tesco or German’s Metro (The Grocer 2000). So 
the more ‘distant’ competitive actions are in both time and geographic origin, the less learning 
can be derived from them to reduce the uncertainty inherent in any internationalization decision, 
and the less perceived future opportunities get confirmed. 
 The strong positive impact (especially) from the home-market rivals might also be 
interpreted as supporting the common view that, in their rush to internationalize, retailers tend to 
be motivated less by the chance of creating value in these new markets than by their fear of 
being left out by their competitors (The Economist 1999). However, our findings suggest that 
economic considerations are definitely not ignored. In line with Tesco’s recognition of the 
emerging middle class as a key driver behind its moves into Central and Eastern Europe (Benady 
1997), we find a positive effect for a target country’s expected retail-sales level, and a negative 
effect for the wealth differential with the (richer) home country. Interestingly, a negative effect is 
found for the difference in population size, suggesting that differences in the logistical 
requirements from what one is used to prevent both an early and a large-scale entry.  
 Even though the Eastern-European market opened to all players simultaneously, not all 
of them struck the different options simultaneously, nor to the same extent. This suggests that 
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not all of them had the necessary resources and capabilities in place that allowed preferential 
access to the various opportunities that suddenly emerged. Our results help to get a better 
understanding of these resource requirements, and to better predict the type of entrant one can 
expect at a certain moment in time. Specifically, we find that both international and regional 
experience are key organizational factors explaining the timing of international expansion into 
various emerging markets. As such, apart from the inter-organizational learning derived from 
observing one’s (home) competitors’ moves, also intra-organizational learning is found to be 
relevant to understand retailers’ internationalization paths. Moreover, we find that if retailers 
enter a considerable number of different countries at a fast pace, it becomes harder to allocate 
considerable resources to each of them. In line with this observation, the French Casino chain 
opted to concentrate its effort on a limited number of countries, as it felt that spreading itself too 
thinly would be inefficient (Dow Jones International News 1998). Even though accumulated 
(worldwide) learning provides a platform that allows one to speed up subsequent international 
entries, this tends to come at the expense of the local coverage in the individual countries. The 
positive effect for regional experience, in contrast, underscores once more the value of a dense 
enough network to successfully operate in local-service industries.  
 Moreover, we find that retailers characterized by a large private-label share in their home 
market tend to be later, smaller-scale entrants. On the demand side, matching new customers’ 
assortment preferences may take longer when private labels substitute for the better-known and, 
in case of emerging markets, long-expected (inter)national brands. On the supply side, a similar 
reliance on private labels as in the home market may entail drastic and time-consuming 
investments in the target country. Tesco, for example, had to convince several of its private-label 
suppliers to set up offices in Central and Eastern Europe to avoid the costly need to ship these 
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goods from its UK home base (Benady 1997). Retailers can respond to competition in their 
maturing home market by diversifying along two dimensions: across product boundaries (e.g. by 
adding new lines to its private-label program) or across market boundaries (i.e. by entering new 
countries). Our findings suggest that a trade-off tends to be made between both options, in that 
prior private-label investments contain an element of inertia that prevents the retailer from 
quickly/ fully exploiting the other diversification option. 
No significant effect was found for firm size. This lack of impact could be driven by a 
variety of factors. First, the aforementioned two opposing forces (economies of scale versus 
bureaucratic inertia) could cancel out one another. Second, all firms in our sample had 
considerable size, in that they belonged to the top 75 European food retailers. More variability in 
the values of this explanatory variable might well have resulted in a significant effect. Moreover, 
it is well known that much of the food range tends to be bought locally (Child 2002). Hence, for 
food retailing, local scale may well be more important than global scale, which is in line with our 
significant positive impact for the regional-experience variable.   
Our results also help to evaluate in what markets early, large-scale entry is more likely to 
occur. In evaluating the attractiveness of a target market, the potential knowledge transfer 
between the new host market and the chain’s home market (or another market the firm is already 
operating in) continues to play an important role, even though Gielens and Dekimpe (2001) 
found that such distance did not affect the retailers’ long-run performance levels in the host 
market. Smaller geographic distance makes it easier to start the required logistic network, while 
the larger purchasing power reflected in a smaller economic distance increases the perceived 
opportunities, thereby reducing the perceived uncertainty and alleviating various (economic 
and/or psychological) barriers to striking an internationalization option. Interestingly, cultural 
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distance does not affect the timing at which an option is struck, but affects the chain’s initial 
level of commitment. Due to the uncertainty present in culturally distant markets, firms tend to 
minimize their (initial) resource commitments (cf. Kim and Hwang 1992). In those markets, 
firms may want to rely more on subsequent intra-organizational learning before committing 
more resources (cf. Brouthers and Brouthers 2001). 
Finally, we find that firms entering late tend to commit smaller resources, in that they 
open a smaller number of stores in their initial year. Gielens and Dekimpe (2001) studied 
whether it is more advantageous for retailers to “quickly enter a market on a more limited scale, 
or to postpone entry until more resources have accumulated to enable a large-scale commitment” 
(p. 236). Our current findings suggest that food retailers, on average, follow a third strategy, in 
that firms which tend to be cautious in their timing of striking an option, exhibit a similar 
constraint when deciding on their level of commitment. Late entrants may thus find it harder to 
digest large initial investments than innovators (Nehrt 1996). However, such a strategy may well 
pose a double hazard on their long-term profitability, as both an early and a substantial entry are 
key determinants of retailers’ long-run efficiency in emerging markets (Gielens and Dekimpe 
2001). 
Future research and limitations  
The current study has a number of limitations, which offer useful areas for future research. First, 
our sample consisted of all entries made by Western-European food retailers towards Central and 
Eastern Europe. As such, no cross-continental moves were considered. The latter moves are still 
less frequent, quite recent, and not yet well documented. Still, it would pay to investigate in 
future research whether our findings generalize to these more distant internationalizations. For 
example, one might want to study whether the role of cultural and/or geographic distance 
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increases when dealing with cross-continental expansions. Moreover, even though Western-
European food retailers account for over 90% of all international entries in the sector in the 
considered time span, the gradual international expansion of American and Japanese retailers 
was not yet reflected in our sample. As non-European retailers become more international 
oriented, the competitive reference-group concept may need further refinement. If German 
retailers would consider entering an emerging market like the Ukraine, will comparable 
legitimization/deterring effects be derived from its French as from its American rivals? 
Moreover, the US giant Wal-Mart may well constitute a reference group of its own. Given Wal-
Mart’s recent entries into both developed (e.g. its takeover of Britain’s ASDA chain in 1999) and 
emerging (e.g. its entry in the Chinese market in 1996) markets, it is worth studying how other 
players in the industry, both incumbents and prospective, react to these moves.  
 Second, we focused on inter-organizational learning in terms of geographically defined 
reference groups. However, alternative operationalizations are feasible. For example, will the 
Danish hard discounter Netto pay closer attention to its Danish rivals (even if their stores are 
traditional supermarkets), or will it focus on the international expansion strategy of Aldi, the 
world’s leading hard discounter? If Carrefour, the world’s second largest retailer, further steps 
up its international expansion, will it be more inclined to trace the moves of the numbers one 
(Wal-Mart) and three (Metro), or will it still pay most attention to its French rivals, such as 
Auchan and Leclerc, even though of smaller size? More research is needed to assess the relative 
value of these alternative (format- or size-based) reference-group definitions. 
 Third, Martin et al. (1998) suggest that also the international expansion strategy of 
upstream channel members matters. Given the importance of good supply chains, retailers may 
want to also monitor the investment decisions of key FMCG manufacturers. 
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 Finally, the option to enter reflects a lumpy investment on the part of the retailers. We did 
not yet consider the subsequent options for future growth, which involve more incremental 
investments. Different processes underlie a firm’s decision to strike either type of option (Bar-
Ilan and Strange 1999), if only because different strategies are available to reduce the intrinsic 
uncertainty. In case of an initial entry (as in our study), no own experience into the specific 
target market is present within the company. External sources of information (such as an 
observation of competitors’ moves) are therefore crucial to reduce the perceived level of 
uncertainty. In contrast, decisions for future growth can be driven by one’s own experience in 
the market, thereby allowing for a more direct way of uncertainty reduction (Rivoli and Salorio 
1996). It is yet unclear, however, what role other players’ moves still play in these decisions, nor 
whether home competitors continue to be monitored more closely when deciding on post-entry 
growth decisions. 
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Figure 2: The Impact of Home-based Rivals 
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Figure 3: The Impact of Foreign Rivals 
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Table 1: Results 
 Speed of entry Size of entry 
 β ⎜t-value⎜ γ ⎜t-value⎜ 
Competitive actions 
Actual home-based players (β1, γ1) 
Actual home-based players2 (β2, γ2) 
 
Actual foreign players (β3, γ3) 
Actual foreign players2 (β4, γ4) 
 
Anticipated home-based players (β5, γ5) 
Anticipated home-based players2 (β6, γ6) 
 
Anticipated foreign players (β7, γ7) 
Anticipated foreign players2 (β8, γ8) 
 
Firm 
Worldwide experience (β9, γ9) 
Regional experience (β10, γ10) 
Private label share (β11, γ11) 
Firm size (β12, γ12) 
 
Host market attractiveness  
Expected retail sales (β13, γ13) 
Cultural distance (β14, γ14) 
Geographic distance (β15, γ15) 
GNP/cap difference (β16, γ16) 
Population (β17, γ17) 
 
Timing (γ18) 
.939
-.534
.585
-.812
.446
-.139
-.536
-.177
.100
.004
-.005
-.0002
.001
.006
-.001
-.039
-.012
9.29
5.23
4.47
1.82
4.49
2.58
3.32
0.55
5.35
4.01
1.87
.41
2.31
0.31
4.54
1.72
3.25
 
a 
a 
 
a 
b 
 
a 
a 
 
a 
 
 
 
a 
a 
b 
 
 
 
b 
 
a 
b 
a 
 
.418
-.612
.132
.989
.263
-.153
-.140
-.260
-.039
.004
-.005
.0001
.005
-.020
-.0003
-.0001
-.013
-.075
5.02
.97
4.32
0.95
9.04
7.24
7.61
.782
1.63
2.05
1.85
.34
9.21
3.95
2.96
1.80
1.78
2.01
a 
 
 
a 
 
 
a 
a 
 
a 
 
 
 
c 
b 
b 
 
 
 
a 
a 
a 
b 
b 
 
d 
a: p < .01 (one-sided), b: p < .05 (one-sided), c: p < .10 (one-sided), and d: p < .05 (two-sided). 
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